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RECENT DECISIONS
ment, or the injury, corroboration of the claimant's testimony may not be
poEsible. Thus, the insurer's financial burden of paying dishonest claims
is countered by the natural sympathy for the employee whose honest claim
goes uncompensated."' Three reasons can be advanced for preferring the
first position over the third position. First, the burden of obtaining evi-
dence to discredit or to corroborate the claimant's testimony, if such evi-
dence can be obtained, may be considerable (crucial medical witnesses are
often quite expensive) and the insurers are better prepareO to meet this
burden tl an are the claimants. Second, most states provide that workmen's
compensation laws must be liberally construed in fafor of the claimant.'
Third, as a policy matter, it is better for the law to assume the claimants
are truthful than to assume they are deceitful.
The second position, permitting the trier of fact to give to the testimony
whatever weight it sees fit, provides a good compromise. The board, com-
mission, jury or judge can look at all the circumstances and all the testi-
mony of the claimant, including his appearance, demeanor, and manner of
testifying, in deciding whether to believe the claimant. Such a position is
more likely to achieve justice and to avoid hardship on either the insurer
or the claimant.
The National Association of Claimant's Compensation Attorneys takes
the interesting position that there must be affirmative evidence to deny com-
pensation just as there must be affirmative evidence to grant it.' The board
or commission, they claim, should not have the power to deny an award
even when the credibility of the claimant's testimony is attacked; there
must be affirmative evidence contradicting or impeaching his testimony to
justify a denial. Although this view places a greater burden on the in-
surer who can better afford it financially, it ignores the fundamental rules
regarding the burden of proof and has not found support in any of the
cases.
The instant case indicates that Montana has adopted the third position.
Although the statement on the problem of uncontradicted, credible testi-
mony of the claimant is dictum it is a clear statement of position and ap-
pears to be the only statement to date of the Montana court on the problem.
It will undoubtedly cause difficulty in the future as pressure increases for
greater and more complete claimant benefits.
THOMAS E. TOWE
GRAZING PERMIT HoLDER LIABLE FOR TRESPASS OF ANIMALS ON UN-
PATENTED MINING CLAIM-Plaintiffs' were holders of unpatented mining
claims located on national forest land. Defendant had been granted a fed-
J This conflict of policy perhaps explains the confusion in the cases on the question.
The courts tend to look at the facts of the particular case to obtain greater justice
for that case and thereby increase their own control over the board or commission.
Also, political philosophies and interests frequently enter into the case at this point.15Generally there is a statute on this point. In Montana the statute is REvisED CODES
OF MONTANA, 1947, § 92-838.
'84 NACCA N.J. 82, 146-149 (1949) ; 5 NACCA N.J. 87, 88 (1950).
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eral sheep grazing permit for an area which included plaintiffs' claims.
Defendant's sheep left natural droppings on the plaintiffs' claims which
rendered the cabins unfit for use as living quarters and which polluted a
spring used for drinking water. In an action for trespass, the jury awarded
$700 damages. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, affirmed.
The owner of sheep grazing under a federal permit is liable in trespass for
injury to the mining operation on unpatented mining claims. Ward v.
Chevallier Ranch Co., 354 P.2d '1031 (Mont. 1960) (Justice Adair dissent-
ing).
The decision is of special note, since it is apparently one of first im-
pression not only in Montana, but in the nation. Because the instant case
involves the competing interests of persons having overlapping rights in
federal land, a brief consideration of the government's policy toward public
lands is necessary to place the problem in proper perspective.
The whole statutory system of administering public lands of the United
States shows a liberality in regard to their use. Persons may settle on and
cultivate ordinary unoccupied public lands and eventually acquire title by
such homesteading. Similarly the United States has suffered its public
domain to be thrown open for the pasturing of livestock, so long as it has
not expressly limited that use.'
The creation of a national forest, however, severs the land from the
public domain and appropriates it to a special public use, so that it is no
longer subject to the implied license to pasture on public lands.! Unless
otherwise authorized by the Chief of the Forest Service, every person must
submit an application and obtain a permit before his livestock can be al-
lowed to graze on national forest land.' This the defendant in the instant
case had done.
The public domain offers, however, not only grazing for livestock, but
also valuable mineral deposits. The discovery of gold in California in 1848
led to a vast influx of prospectors upon the public lands and in the ensuing
years great mineral wealth was taken from the public lands without any
control by the federal government.! In the absence of statutory controls,
a set of rules governing the rights and duties of such prospectors toward
each other grew up through custom and usage.' These rules were so prac-
tical and successful that when Congress finally acted in 1866, it gave them
the sanction of law in so far as they did not conflict with the federal
statutes." Subsequent legislation specified with greater particurarity the
modes of location and appropriation and extent of each mining claim,
recognizing, however, the essential features of the rules framed by miners.!
It is the policy of government to encourage the development of mines and
every facility is afforded for that purpose, but the government exacts a
faithful compliance with the conditions required.'
'See Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320 (1890).
'See Shannon v. United States, 160 Fed. 870 (9th Cir. 1908).
'36 C.F.R. § 231.3.
'Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U.S. 350, 352 (1884).
'See Glacier Mountain Silver Mining Co. v. Willis, 127 U.S. 471 (1888).
614 Stat. 262 § 1 (1866).
'Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440, 441 (1883).
'United States v. Iron Silver Mining Co., 128 U.S. 673, 675 (1888).
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National forest lands embraced in a mining claim continue to be part
of the forest reserve and within the jurisdiction of the forest service until
a patent is obtained, but subject to all the legal rights of the locator.' Prior
to the granting of a patent for a mining claim, the locator may use the
claim for mining and processing operations and other uses reasonably inci-
dent thereto; but his unpatented claim is subject to the right of the United
States to manage and dispose of the vegetative resources of the surface and
the locator may not sever or remove any vegetative or other surface re-
sources except to the extent required for prospecting, mining or processing
operations.'
In the instant case, then, the problem posed is how rights should be
adjusted between a grazing permittee and the owners of unpatented mining
claims where free grazing threatens to interfere with the mining operation.
Federal law gives to the miner with unpatented claims a right to be free
of interference in his mining operation, and to the stockman a right freely
to graze in the national forest even upon the mining claim, so long as he
does not interfere with the operation thereon.' The miner wrongfully in-
terfered with must look to state law, however, for vindication of his right.
A Montana statute2 regulates actions for trespass by stock to patented
mining claims, but, as the court here held, that statute is inapplicable to
this case. Plaintiffs here had to proceed at common law. The court held
that they had a remedy in trespass.
The decision presents several difficulties. First, the continued refer-
ence to trespass implies that defendant's sheep had entered premises where
they were forbidden to go, but this is not true. The sheep were entitled freely
to move through the mining claims so long as they did not interfere with
the operation. In this case it was not their entry that caused interference,
but rather it was their remaining too long in one place. The action at com-
mon law would not be trespass but an action on the case.' That the sheep
did not trespass convinces the dissenting justice, Adair, to conclude that no
action will lie, yet the action is not for entry but for consequential inter-
ference with mining use. That the injury came about by way of the
"natural functions" of the sheep seems irrelevant if there was substantial
resultant harm, particularly when that harm was foreseeable. Justice Adair
asserts that defendant committed no unlawful act, but the proof showed an
intentional bedding down of the sheep near the cabins and bedding them
there more than one night, both contrary to the instructions of the district
ranger.
Second, the court refers repeatedly to the fact that the boundaries and
corners of the claim were marked and even states as one of the two questions
at issue :"
'United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 Fed. 675, 684 (N.D. Idaho 1910).
1069 Stat. 368 (1955), 30 U.S.C. § 612 (1958).
"Ibid.
'RsvISEO CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 46-1413.
'52 AM. Jum, Trespass on the Case § 5 (1944).
'Instant case at 1032.
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Were the boundaries and corners of the land involved herein
marked and designated in such manner as to notify the public as
to the location of plaintiffs' claims?
It is difficult to see how the question of marked boundaries is even relevant
to the case, much less hov' it can be one of the two issues in the case. Mark-
ing of boundaries would have been relevant if the Montana statute on tres-
pass to patented claims were involved, since liability thereunder is limited
to trespasses where the claim is marked out or the defendant has actual
knowledge of its boundaries, but the court held without hesitation that the
statute is inapplicable to unpatented claims. One herding sheep is, under
common law principles, liable for trepass to the lands of another even
though he is unaware of the boundaries.' The discussion of marking bound-
aries and corners is thus only confusing.
The third difficulty is that under the decision the holder of a patented
claim has less protection than the holder of an unpatented claim. By statute
the owner of a patented claim can have an action against the owner of sheep
for more than nominal damages only if (1) the boundaries of the claim are
marked or the latter has actual knowledge of them and (2) a demand for
payment of damages is made within six months.' The holder of an un-
patented claim can have an action for more than nominal damages even
without demand within six months though he must presumably show either
an intentional or negligent interference with his activities.
The dissent in the principal case directs attention to the effect which
the majority holding has upon the stock industry of this state. Justice
Adair concludes that the majority opinion places every Montana stockman
who has a permit to use national forest lands in the position of exercising
his permit at the risk of being held liable in trespass for interference with
the operation of any mineral claim. The proposition as stated, however,
represents no change in the" risk" from what has been required under prior
law. Federal law since 1955 has provided that the United States, its per-
mittees, or licensees, must, under the law, not endanger or materially inter-
fere with prospecting, mining, or processing operations or uses reasonably
incident thereto.' 'Since sheep, under Montana law, must be tended by a
sheepherder,' it is not unreasonable to require such sheepherder to avoid any
unlawful interference by his sheep with the mining operation. A similar
duty upon cattlemen, however, is more onerous since cattle are i1 ot included
in herd laws, but are usually permitted to run at large in appropriate graz-
ing areas.
The only effective means of preventing unlawful interference with
mining operations by livestock that are not being herded is the use of parti-
tion fences. The problem of iincing requires a consideration of the relative
burdens which would be placed on mining claim holders or livestock grazing
permittees by requiring them to ereci such fences. As a rule, one grazing
permittee does not have an exclusive right t9 a national forest area. The
'Herrin v. Sieben, 46 Mont. 226, 127 Pac. 323 (1912).
taSupra note 12.
1769 Stat. 368 (1955), g0 U.S.C. § 612(b) (1958).
tmREvISED OODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 46-1704.
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constant change in the number and identity of the grazing permittees would
make apportionment of fence and maintenance costs between them very dif-
ficult. In order for stockmen to be sure that their cattle would not inter-
fere with mining operations, it would be necessary for them to fence all
doubtful areas on the claims and might also result in the otherwise un-
necessary closing off of land suitable for grazing purposes. The stockman
would be forced to keep all known and potential mining sites in the grazing
area under constant surveillance in order that he might know when existing
miners have changed their requirements and when new claimants have com-
menced operations. This could well be a very great burden considering the
notorious unpredictability of the small mine industry.
On the other hand, if the burden of fencing is placed on the mining
claim holder, he could fence off only those critical areas in which entering
livestock would interfere with his mining operations. Unnecessary fencing
of grazing areas would thus be avoided.
Montana statutes generally require an owner of property to "fence
out" possible trespassing animals in order to protect himself. In Shannon
v. United States,' an action to enjoin trespass of stock upon a federal forest
reserve, the court held Montana "fence out" statutes inapplicable to fed-
eral lands, stating :'
[T] he state of Montana had no dominion over the public lands ly-
ing within its borders, and no power to enact legislation directly
or indirectly affecting the same .... Its own laws in regard to fenc-
ing and pasturing cattle at large must be held to apply only to land
subject to its own dominion .... The rights given by state statutes
to the subjects of the state extend only to the lands of the state.
They end at the borders of government lands ....
The Montana legislature, therefore, is powerless to require fencing of fed-
eral lands. The federal regulations concerning the administration of na-
tional forest lands are silent on the question of fencing requirements.
Under the principles discussed, a reasonable solution to the problem
presented would be the promulgation by the federal government and its
agencies of regulations requiring unpatented mining claim holders to fence
out livestock before beilig entitled to any more than nominal damages for
trespass.
ROBERT CORONTZOS
1Rmwsm COlzS OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 46-1409, -1410.
1°160 Fed. 870 (9th 0ir. 1908). This rule is not without exception, however. Where
a stockman turns his stock loose on his own property known to be insufficient to
support them and such stock thereafter enter upon the unfenced land of another,
the courts have often held the stockman liable for damages notwithstanding the
fence out rule. See, e.g., Hill v. Chappel Bros., 93 Mont. 92, 18 P.2d 1106 (1932)




Corontzos: Ward v. Chevallier Ranch Co.
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1960
